



THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505



National Intelligence Officers

NIO 2103-77
19 August 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence
FROM: 
SUBJECT: Review of the Kemp/Ullman Papers


STAT

1. On 6 July Professor Kemp sent you two papers he co-authored with LCDR Ullman. One paper--"Towards a New Order of U.S. Maritime Policy"--was published in the Naval War College Review; the other--"U.S. Global Strategy; The Future of the Half-War Planning Contingency"--does not appear to have been published yet. You asked that they be reviewed and briefed to you.

2. Attached are very brief summaries of each paper with my comments on each and a draft reply for your consideration.

STAT

Attachment:
"Half-War Planning Contingency"--
Summary and Comments
"U.S. Maritime Policy"--Summary
and Comments
Draft Reply



HALF-WAR PLANNING CONTINGENCY

SUMMARY

1. The US is over-concentrating on the strategic nuclear and central front balances--the one-war portion of the 1 1/2 war planning assumption--to the detriment of the requirements of the half-war contingency.

2. The importance of areas covered by the half-war contingency forces--the Middle East-Persian Gulf; Northern European theater, Western Pacific, etc.--has increased over the last few years because of the growing dependence upon foreign sources of natural resources--particularly oil--and associated sea lines of communications while at the same time US access to these areas is faced by new constraints imposed by increased Soviet military power, growing military capabilities of littoral states and the new ocean regime, including: 200-mile exclusive economic zones, off-shore drilling and pollution control zones.

3. To counter this problem the authors suggest the following:

a. To fight tendency to over-concentrate on the strategic nuclear and central front balances, add a member to the NFIB to develop "unconventional" approaches to US strategic policy and testing current and future options.

b. A combination of US and allied actions should be made to limit western vulnerabilities in the Northern Flanks, Persian Gulf and Pacific.

c. Express future policy actions in terms of preferred outcomes--not in vague terms of national interest.

COMMENTS

1. The paper makes the point on page 2 that it is important to adequate planning that we create policy based on a set of "preferred outcomes" instead of a more rigid set of "national interests." The examples of these preferred outcomes are--"prevention of war with the Soviet Union" and "limitation of any conflict should it occur" and "maintenance of access to overseas areas." The concept of "preferred outcomes" does not seem to offer any advantage and is not even

distinguishable from the current--and supposedly more rigid and narrow--concept of strategic objectives. A convincing case is not made for the concept which is the final recommendation of the paper. In any case the phrase "preferred outcome" creates a problem. For example, it implies that there are other acceptable outcomes. I suspect we as a nation would not want to articulate the idea that strategic deterrence--our most preferred outcome--has an acceptable alternative. The concept of goals and objectives seems to offer the greatest flexibility.

2. The paper, throughout, repeats the theme that there is too much emphasis on Strategic Warfare and the balance on the Central Front without adequate consideration of other areas. The authors should be aware that the current administration is in the process of identifying alternative military strategies in a manner which attempts to integrate all areas of critical US interest to produce a properly balanced military strategy. I believe the authors are right about the focus, however. The extremely light treatment given in PRM-10 of the Persian Gulf vulnerabilities and importance are examples.

3. The authors hypothesize that because of the careful attention to Strategic Warfare and the balance in the Central Front stability will be maintained there and in a crisis the Soviets will capitalize on surprise and take action elsewhere but so as to control the conflict and influence a post-war settlement. They suggest that Soviet occupation of the North Cape of Norway or some action to remove Western access to Persian Gulf oil.

a. With respect to the Northern flank, I can't imagine a situation which is stable or low level on the Central Front where immediately proximate conflict would not destroy that stability. Additionally, however, the uncertainty of success and the lack of any clear benefit probably make that operation unattractive.

b. The Persian Gulf presents a much more interesting set of options, costs and benefits (page 14-16). Of these, the one selected--occupy a portion of the upper Persian Gulf littoral--assumes this is feasible while maintaining all of the other balances intact and ignores the fact that it may not produce a significant impact soon enough.

4. With respect to the Pacific the authors properly focus on the need for a total force view of force balances. They argue that "Trident" deployments to the Pacific will cause Soviet counter SLBM deployments to the Pacific. These forces will be flexible in their capability. If US actions like a carrier task force transfer from PAC to LANT take place, a large imbalance may be created. It should be noted that Trident will

replace existing missiles in SSBNs--and as such does not represent a new threat but a more capable system, and as such would not necessarily create Soviet reaction in terms of force levels. For example when the US went to POSEIDON there is no evidence of Soviet counter-SSBN developments that were keyed to that specific event.

5. Page 20, first line, uses the term National Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board which is probably intended to be the NFIB. The function of developing threats to US interests rests with the Intelligence Community. The development of "unconventional approaches toward US strategic policy" would more appropriately be a function for the NSC Staff.

6. The third recommendation focuses on the importance of the Persian Gulf to the West and urges an increase in our base support structure. It is not clear that Soviet interest in this area will not increase to approach that of the West in the 1980s and beyond. Further, it is not clear that the Soviets will possess any inherent operational advantage in the area under a properly negotiated "demilitarization" in the area. This is particularly true in view of the points made in the article about trends in Soviet influence in the area and the growing strength of littoral states--particularly Iran and India.

7. The fourth recommendation includes splitting the Trident force to both oceans to reduce the impact of likely Soviet counter-deployments. First, there is no high probability that Trident--as a replacement--would elicit significantly different force deployments by the Soviets than did its predecessor. Secondly, the costs of splitting the force is enormous in the early stages. Additionally, if the Soviets reacted by building more ASW-oriented but flexible resources for the Atlantic, our motivation to swing more to the Atlantic from the Pacific would weaken the balance in the Pacific. Finally, Trident will ultimately replace the present SSBN force completely with the same result as placing all Trident forces in the Pacific except that the later phasing of Trident into the Pacific would be done in a period of less certainty about relative capability and with potentially greater risk involved.

TOWARDS A NEW ORDER OF US MILITARY POLICY

SUMMARY

I. Proposition

The US does not have a coordinated or articulated maritime policy sufficient to cope with the fundamental changes taking place in the strategic environment. Unless we make certain critical decisions concerning the nature and direction of this policy for the next decade, we may find our international position severely eroded.

II. Argument

A. Importance of maritime environment has grown considerably.

1. Sea resources
2. Sea transportation

B. Western access to this environment is facing new constraints.

1. Growth of Soviet naval power
2. Law of the Sea
3. Growth in military strength of littoral states
4. Western naval powers are losing access to overseas military facilities

C. US maritime policy debate now almost exclusively concerned with US-Soviet naval balance.

The other factors are also of great importance and must be considered in US maritime policy.

D. US maritime policymaking community cuts across many organizations, bureaucratic politics hinders formulation of a coordinated maritime policy. There is no clear understanding of maritime issues and no effective balanced coordination of the various interests in government.

III. Conclusions

In the emerging maritime environment the US has the opportunity to reap major benefits. To capitalize, US must make tough decisions with regard to priorities in view of escalating financial and political costs of maintaining the necessary worldwide maritime presence.

A. Politically the US should take steps to better coordinate the bureaucratic machinery which establishes and executes an overall maritime strategy.

B. Commercially, the US should:

1. Increase commercial shipbuilding to exploit fish and mineral resources.

2. Articulate strong support for commercial exploitation of the 200 NM economic zone.

3. Exploit advantage in maritime technology in resource location, ocean drilling and mining, fish breeding, and large superstable floating concrete platforms.

C. Military, the US should counter Soviet naval power by:

1. Exploiting Soviet geographic weaknesses by expanding mine warfare and mine delivery systems capabilities.

2. Signal US resolve in critical areas such as the Indian Ocean by subtle and low-key diplomatic and naval initiatives.

3. Making it increasingly difficult for the Soviet Union to consider seriously conventional naval missions such as interdiction of SLOCs. Development of SES, VSTOL, improved Harpoon with independent OTH capability are suggested along with greater use of air force systems in sea control/sea denial.

4. Increase defense coordination with allies.

COMMENTS

1. At the bottom of page 103 and top of page 104 the authors imply that US planning ignores the likelihood of occurrence of contingencies and focuses almost exclusively on the consequence of the contingency. I don't think this is a valid criticism. I think that we use both in national security planning. Limited resources are applied to contingencies first that threaten national survival until their likelihood of occurrence is reduced to an acceptable level, e.g., strategic forces and deterrence.

2. On page 105 the authors list five vital signs that analysts should focus on. The signs listed are in fact routinely used. For example, it is the interpretation of Soviet writings in fact which create community differences in opinion about the importance Soviet

planners place in the interdiction of sea lines of communication. It is probably not a faulty model used in analysis which is likely to cause us trouble, it is more likely to be a faulty interpretation and derived "intent."

3. On pages 108 and 109 the point is made that we do not have existent an integrated maritime strategy for the future and we don't have the bureaucratic organization that is likely to develop one. With both of these points I agree. As resources become scarce relative to requirements the function of government to plan and program expands. Energy is a good example; planning our proper use and access to the ocean for communications, resources, and security is probably another.

4. Pages 111 and 112 discuss some developments that are considered desirable like VSTOL, SES, OTH Harpoon, and the like. It is easy to write a list of programs which offer new advantages. As with many wish lists these are developed without fiscal constraint and in the case of overseas bases without adequate consideration of political restraint. What will be given up to get these systems?

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
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July 6, 1977


ADM Stansfield Turner USN
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Stan:

Enclosed are two papers written by
myself and Harlan Ullman which you might
find of interest.

With best wishes.

Sincerely yours,


Geoffrey Kemp
Associate Professor of
International Politics

GK:mn

Enclosures (2)

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Cable FLETCHER

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U.S. Global Strategy: The Future of the
Half-War Planning Contingency

Geoffrey Kemp

Harlan Ullman

June 1977